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ABSTRACT 
This paper briefly discusses the causes and consequences of financial dollarization with 
special reference to the recent Turkish experience. Most developing countries have a limited, 
unofficial form of dollarization, which makes them vulnerable to external shocks through 
currency mismatches. Financial dollarization can limit the scope of macroeconomic policies 
and cause fear of floating. Consequently, dedollarization policies are now shifting from a 
generally passive stance “learning to live with it” type approach to a more active stance such 
as “carrot and stick” approach. This paper also presents a composite financial dollarization 
index for Turkey along with a brief discussion of corporate sector debt dollarization. The 
recent Turkish experience towards endogenous dedollarization appears to be consistent with 
the view that dedollarization can also be viewed as a side effect of prudent fiscal and 
monetary policies. Although the dollarization composite index is on a decreasing trend, it is 
however still high. Therefore, an active dedollarization strategy associated with a sound 
macroeconomic policy stance should be considered to support the implementation of a Full 
Fledged Inflation Targeting Regime in the near future. 
Keywords: Financial Dollarization, Dedollarization, Turkey. 
ÖZET 
Bu çalışmada yakın dönem Türkiye deneyimi özelinde finansal dolarizasyonun neden ve 
sonuçları tartışılacaktır.Gelişmekte olan bir çok ülkede sınırlı, resmi olmayan dolarizasyon 
mevcuttur. Bu tip ülkeler ekonomilerindeki  para uyuşmazlığı nedeniyle dışsal soklara karşı 
kırılgandır. Finansal dolarizasyon politika uygulamasında farklı k ısıtlara ve dalgalanma 
korkusuna neden olabilmektedir. Dedolarizasyon politikaları aktif bir nitelik kazanarak 
“dolarizasyon ile yaşamayı öğrenmek” yerine “ödül (havuç) ve yaptırım (sopa)” yaklaşımına 
kaymaktadır. Bu çalışmada Türkiye için bileşik finansal dolarizasyon endeksi sunulmakta ve 
ülkedeki şirketler kesiminin borç dolarizasyonu kısaca tartışılmaktadır.Ülkemizde son yıllarda 
gözlenen makroekonomik disiplin ve buna eşik eden içsel dedolarizasyon süreci, 
dedolarizasyonun ihtiyatlı maliye ve para politikalarının sonucunda oluşacağını öne süren 
görüş ile tutarlıdır. Türkiye’de dolarizasyon birleşik endeksi azalsada, halen yüksek 
seviyededir. Yakın gelecekte açık enflasyon hedeflemesi rejimi uygulanacak olan ülkemizde 
istikrar programına eşlik eden aktif bir dedolarizasyon stratejisinin uygulanacak olan para 
politikasını destekleyeceği düşünülmektedir. 
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FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION, (DE)DOLLARIZATION AND THE TURKISH 
EXPERIENCE 
“Although some transition economies have managed to reverse or slow dollarization by establishing credible 
currencies and a stable macroeconomic environment, dollarization is not going to wither away.” 
                            Honohan and Shi (2002) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper financial dollarization and its economic policy consequences considering 
also the recent Turkish experience is discussed. As it is generally agreed, many economies -
especially emerging countries- have significant amount of foreign currencies in their 
monetary systems. The existence of dollarization may cause problems in implementation of 
monetary policy and fear of floating, reduces seignorage revenue and can increase exposure 
of financial system to external shocks through currency/maturity mismatches.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the second section fundamental concepts 
about dollarization will be presented. Section II discusses also official dollarization. Section 
III presents partial (unofficial) dollarization and dollarization composite indices for Turkey. 
Section IV is devoted to a brief discussion of corporate/real sector liability dollarization in 
Turkey. Finally, Section V concludes.  
 
II. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS ABOUT DOLLARIZATION  
The “dollarization” is a shorthand term for the use of any foreign currency by another 
country. Most developing countries have a limited, unofficial form of dollarization. To a 
greater or lesser degree, their residents already hold foreign currency and foreign currency-
denominated deposits at domestic banks. In high inflation countries, dollars or some other 
hard currency may be in widespread use in daily transactions, alongside the local currency.  
Informal (unofficial) dollarization is often the result of economic instability and high 
inflation, and the desire of residents to diversify and protect their assets from the risks of 
devaluation of their own currencies. According to Schuler (2000), unofficial dollarization 




currency is not legal tender
1. It is useful to distinguish between two motives for the demand 
for foreign currency assets: “currency substitution” and “asset substitution”. In the case of 
“currency substitution” foreign assets are used as money, essentially as means of payment and 
unit of account, and it typically arises under conditions of high inflation or hyperinflation 
when the high cost of using domestic currency for transactions causes the economic agents to 
search for available alternatives. Once the use of foreign currency in transactions becomes 
accepted, it may not be rapidly abandoned. Remarkably, the increase in dollarization in some 
Latin American and Asian countries has continued and accelerated in recent years even a 
following successful stabilization program. On the other hand, “Asset substitution” results 
from risk and return considerations about domestic and foreign assets. Historically, foreign 
currency-denominated assets have provided the opportunity of insuring against 
macroeconomic risks, such as price instability and prolonged depressions in many developing 
countries. Even under conditions of currency stability, foreign currency-denominated assets 
may still serve it.  
In addition to these, The World Bank Group categorizes dollarization in three groups: 
asset dollarization, liability dollarization and full dollarization
2. The term “Asset 
Dollarization” refers to the use of foreign currency in any of the three functions of money: 
unit of account, means of exchange and store of value. “Currency Substitution” refers to the 
use of foreign money only as means of exchange. Thus an economy can be highly dollarized, 
but not subject to currency substitution. “Liability Dollarization” which has emerged in the 
recent literature of currency and banking crises in emerging markets is that either the 
domestic banking system or the government can have relatively large foreign currency debt 
obligations. Therefore a country can be scarcely dollarized in the asset side, but the loans 
made by the banking system can be mostly in foreign currency. “Full or official 
Dollarization” is a situation in which a country abandons its own currency and adopts another 
country's currency as a means of payment and unit of account. Few countries in the world 
have dollarized completely (e.g. Panama). 
According to IMF (World Economic Outlook, 1997, p. 92): 
“Dollarization, the holding by residents of a significant share of their assets in 
foreign-currency-denominated form, is a common feature of developing and transition 
economies. It is a response to economic instability and high inflation, and to the desire 
of domestic residents to diversify their asset portfolios. In countries experiencing high 
                                                 
1 Legal tender means that a currency is legally acceptable as payment for all debts, unless perhaps the parties to the payment 
have specified payment in another currency. Legal tender differs from forced tender, which means that people must accept a 
currency in payment even if they would prefer to specify another currency (Schuler, 2000). 




inflation dollarization is typically quite widespread, as the public seeks protection 
from the cost of holding assets denominated in domestic currency. But remarkably, the 
increase in dollarization in some Latin American and Asian countries has continued 
and even accelerated in recent years following successful stabilization.” 
In addition to all these classifications, in the last years with the help of increasing 
financial globalization, a new term that is “financial dollarization” has emerged. Financial 
dollarization comprise both sides of economic agents’ balance sheets in the economy, 
therefore it is broader concept than liability dollarization (liability side of balance sheet) and 
asset dollarization (asset side of balance sheet).  Financial dollarization is defined as the 
holding by residents of foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities including non-
bank assets such as sovereign debt. According to Levy-Yeyati and Arias (2003) financial 
dollarization, in turn, simply denotes an empirical observation, namely, the holding by 
residents of foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities that includes nonbank assets 
such as commercial paper or sovereign debt. 
 
Official Dollarization 
In the official dollarization, which is also called full dollarization foreign currency is 
accepted as legal tender. Hence in addition to private agents in the economy, government 
also makes its payments in the form of foreign currency. Official dollarization functions as 
monetary system among regions of a single country or an officially dollarized country may 
be thought as a part of regional currency area. As it is known, arbitrage in any regional 
currency area yields similar price levels for tradable goods and services. Therefore inflation 
rate differences among countries are supposed to converge each other. 
Full dollarization creates some opportunities and threats for any country. Main 
advantages of dollarization are decrease in nominal interest rates, disappearance of currency 
crises, stable growth and prices, increase in economic and financial integration. On the other 
hand, loss of independent monetary policy and seignorage revenue is seen as the basic threats 
or disadvantages of dollarization. 
Official dollarization regime has pros and cons like other economic decisions
3. A 
country should consider its special properties when evaluating pros and cons of dollarization. 
But some general conditions may be discussed. For example, officially dollarization may 
present more benefits relative to the costs for any country, if there is a poor history of 
monetary  performance, the advantage of keeping a national currency is smaller, there is 
                                                 




significant unofficially dollarization (small seignorage revenue) and substance of price 
stickiness in terms of foreign currency. But it should be considered that devaluation decision 
could not be taken easily since its’ negative effects on   financial institutions and firms. 
 
Partial or Unofficial Dollarization 
Unofficial dollarization is seen when domestic residents prefer to hold much of their 
financial wealth in the form of foreign assets, although foreign currency is not accepted as 
“legal tender”. Basic unofficial dollarization instruments are foreign bonds and other 
nonmonetary assets that generally held abroad, foreign currency deposits held abroad, 
foreign currency deposits in the domestic banking system and foreign notes in circulation.  
Economists are putting more emphasis on caution as the costs and risks of 
dollarization have become more apparent (Heysen, 2005). Unofficial dollarization makes 
demand for domestic currency unstable. Hence central bank may face with difficulties in the 
case of changing portfolio preferences of investors over domestic currency and foreign 
currency. In addition to this “instability effect on the demand for money”, it may create 
“stability effect on the banking system” since depositors are allowed to hold foreign 
exchange deposits, and they do not need to send their deposits abroad.  The degree of 
unofficial dollarization is often assessed by the ratio of foreign currency deposits to overall 
deposit volume in the banking system or broad money generally. However, such a measure 
may be misleading as it does not contain the foreign currency in circulation which is often 
unmeasured but a significant component of unofficial dollarization (Reinhart et al., 2003). 
In addition to these types, liability dollarization may be observed. Liability 
dollarization concept emerged in the recent literature of currency and banking crises in 
emerging markets and it is seen either the domestic banking system or the government has 
relatively large foreign currency debt obligations. Therefore a country can be scarcely 
dollarized in the asset side, but the loans made by the banking system can be mostly in 
foreign currency.  
Partial dollarization may create obstacles for any monetary policy implementation. 
For example, currency substitution affects the choice of monetary aggregates in the monetary 
targeting policy as the presence of it implies that dollar monetary assets should also be the 
relevant concept of money. As it is widely acknowledged today, the breakdown of the 




and unhappy experience of pegged exchange rate regime countries made Full Fledged 
Inflation Targeting monetary regimes (FFIT) more attractive in recent years.  However, 
partial dollarization creates some obstacles also for successful implementation of FFIT.  This 
is because; the absence of external dominance (high degree dollarization) is required for a 
successful FFIT (Mishkin, 2004). Inflation targeting regimes require flexible exchange rate 
regimes. The volatility of exchange rates may increase domestic currency value of foreign 
exchange denominated/ linked debt, may spur currency and asset substitution and may harm 
balance sheets of firms, households and banks in the case of high level of financial 
dollarization. An external shock may also trigger increasing debt burden of treasury that has 
significant amount of FX linked and FX denominated debt. Furthermore, it may also affect 
financial and real sector balance sheets negatively in the case of high financial dollarization. 
Significant depreciation of domestic currency may affect financial solvency of firms and 
financial institutions. Therefore, the scope for FFIT regime may be severely limited when 
financial dollarization in the economy is significant (Mishkin, 2004). 
To summarize, financial dollarization causes currency mismatches in the economy. 
The dollarization of public debt and dollarization of firms and financial institutions’ balance 
sheets increase the fragility of real and financial sectors. Sharp currency depreciation may 
cause unsustainable fiscal balances and may cause bank and firm collapses since assets are 
typically denominated in domestic currency and so do not increase in value, there is a 
resulting decline in net worth. This deterioration in balance sheets then increases adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, which leads to financial instability and a sharp decline 
in investment and economic activity (Mishkin, 2001 and Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía 2004). 
When we consider also the “original sin” hypothesis that means most countries cannot 
borrow from international capital markets in their own currencies we may observe increasing 
exposure of financial dollarization on the economy as a whole. 
Another risk of financial dollarization is related to pricing behavior of firms in the 
economy (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). In a financially dollarized country the exchange rate 
passthrough is high which is important for a central bank whose main objective is achieving 
price stability. In a financially dollarized economy, real seignorage revenue is shared by 
foreign currency issuer central bank and domestic currency issuer central bank. Therefore 
financial dollarization also reduces seignorage revenue of domestic authorities.  
Reinhart et al. (2003) find little empirical support for the view that dollarization 




been higher and more volatile in countries with a high degree of dollarization than in those 
where the degree of dollarization has been low or moderate. They find significant exchange 
rate pass through in partially dollarized countries.  
III. A DOLLARIZATION COMPOSITE INDEX FOR TURKEY 
In this section, a composite index developed by Reinhart et al. (2003) is constructed 
to determine dollarization trends in Turkey. In Reinhart et al. (2003) composite index of 
dollarization was defined as the sum of the ratio of foreign currency deposits (FCD) to broad 
money, the ratio of domestic government debt in foreign currency to total domestic 
government debt, and the ratio of external debt to GNP. To construct the composite index, 
each of the three ratios was previously transformed into an index that takes values ranging 
from 0 to 10. Then, the composite index is constructed by summing those three ratios. As 
expected, the composite index takes values ranging from 0 to 30. 
Table 1 demonstrates the criteria used to transform the ratios obtained from data to 
indices. Table 2 demonstrates the composite index, its determinants and their index values 
for Turkey. The dollarization composite index values increased especially in crisis years of 
1994, 1999 and 2001. This is consistent with theoretical explanations of dollarization. As 
discussed above, partial dollarization is result of some macroeconomic factors and 
institutional factors. Macroeconomic imbalances in country, such as high and volatile 
inflation rates and depreciating domestic currency, unsuccessful stabilization efforts, 
financial crises, under developed capital markets and loss of confidence in domestic currency 
may cause and exacerbate partial dollarization. In addition to these macroeconomic factors, 
some institutional factors may also affect the partial dollarization process in country. In the 
crisis years macroeconomic factors and instutional factors deteriorate and support partial 
dollarization. 
 
Table 1: Indices of Dollarization 
Ratio (R)  Index Value  Ratio (R)  Index Value 
R=0  0  5<R<6 or R=6  6 
0<R<1 or R=1  1  6<R<7 or R=7  7 
1<R<2 or R=2  2  7<R<8 or R=8  8 
2<R<3 or R=3  3  8<R<9 or R=9  9 
3<R<4 or R=4  4  R>9  10 




















FX denominated or 
linked domestic debt / 
Total domestic 
government debt * 
(FX denominated or 
linked domestic debt / 
Total domestic 






1989 0,19  2  -  -  -  -  2 
1990 0,20  2  0,33  3  -  -  5 
1991 0,31  3  0,34  3  -  -  6 
1992 0,38  4  0,35  4  -  -  8 
1993 0,53  5  0,38  4  -  -  9 
1994 0,47  5  0,51  5  -  -  10 
1995 0,46  5  0,43  4  -  -  9 
1996 0,46  5  0,44  4  -  -  9 
1997 0,49  5  0,44  4  -  -  9 
1998 0,42  4  0,48  5  0,07  1  10 
1999 0,47  5  0,56  6  0,05  1  12 
2000 0,46  5  0,60  6  0,08  1  12 
2001 0,53  5  0,80  8  0,36  4  17 
2002 0,53  5  0,73  7  0,32  3  15 
2003 0,47  5  0,61  6  0,22  2  13 
2004 0.42  4  0.54  5  0.18  2  11 
* in terms of TL. **The annual GNP in terms of USD is calculated by dividing quarterly GNP to CBRT’s 
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The success of recently completed stabilization program in dedollarization route is 
clear. Implementation of stabilization program alleviated macroeconomic and institutional 
factors that support dollarization and therefore dollarization composite index decreased from 
17 to 11. The recent Turkish experience towards endogenous dedollarization thus appears to 
be consistent with the view that dedollarization can also be viewed as a side effect of prudent 
fiscal and monetary policies. Although the dollarization composite index decreased 




active dedollarization strategy associated with a sound macroeconomic policy stance such as 
the one suggested by the carrot and stick approach should be emphasized
4.   
According to Reinhart et al. (2003), the degree of dollarization is considered as low 
for the range of 0-3, moderate for the range of 4-8, high for the range of 9-13 and very high 
for the range of 14-30. Graph 3 presents the degree of dollarization in Turkey. The average 
figure for the relevant period is 10 in Turkey and can be interpreted as high.  
 





















































































In Reinhart et al. (2003), the variety of dollarization in any country at any point in 
time is determined by considering the degree of domestic dollarization and the amount of 
foreign borrowing by the private sector. The domestic dollarization is determined by looking 
at the ratios of foreign currency deposits to broad money and of domestic government debt in 
foreign currency to total government debt. Countries are then divided in two groups: those 
where both ratios are below 10 percent, and those where at least one of the ratios exceeds 10 
percent. The amount of private foreign borrowing is considered by determining share of 
private sector debt in total external debt. Countries are divided in two groups too: those where 
private sector debt accounts for at least 10 percent of total external debt, and those where the 
share is below 10 percent. By using those two criteria an economy can be classified into four 
categories. A country where domestic and external liability dollarization co-exist are 
                                                 




classified as category 1; a country where dollarization is predominantly of a domestic nature 
is classified as category 2, a country where dollarization is predominantly of an external 
nature and private borrowing is not small is classified as category 3 and a country where 
domestic dollarization is low and where the bulk of the external liabilities are owed by the 
government is classified as category 4 (Table 3). When those criteria are applied for Turkey, 
we see Turkey is in the first category in the relevant period (Table 4). The significant increase 
in the share of private debt in total external debt draws attention. 
 
Table 3:  Varieties of Dollarization 
 
Private sector debt accounts for ten 
percent or more of total external debt 
Private sector debt accounts for less than ten 
percent of total external debt 
At least ten percent of broad 
money or of domestic public 
debt are denominated in or 
linked to a foreign currency 
Category 1  Category 2 
Less than ten percent of broad 
money and of domestic public 
debt are denominated in or 
linked to a foreign currency 
Category 3  Category 4 
 
Table 4: Variety of Dollarization in TURKEY 
 FCD/M2Y* 
FX denominated or linked 
domestic debt / Total domestic 
government debt 
The share of private debt in total external debt 
** 
Dollarization Category
1989 0,19  -  -  1 
1990 0,20  -  -  1 
1991 0,31  -  -  1 
1992 0,38  -  -  1 
1993 0,53  -  -  1 
1994 0,47  -  -  1 
1995 0,46  -    1 
1996 0,46  -  0,33  1 
1997 0,49  -  0,39  1 
1998 0,42  0,07  0,45  1 
1999 0,47  0,05  0,48  1 
2000 0,46  0,08  0,47  1 
2001 0,53  0,36  0,37  1 
2002 0,53  0,32  0,34  1 
2003 0,47  0,22  0,35  1 
2004 0,42  0,18  0,41  1 





IV. REAL SECTOR DOLLARIZATION 
The success of recent stabilization program in (financial) dedollarization route is clear 
as discussed in previous section. However, financial dollarization concept is not enough for 
evaluating dollarization. Real sector (balance sheet) dollarization is also as important as 
financial dollarization and it should be considered. Although the main aim of this paper is to 
investigate financial dollarization especially, in this section liability dollarization in the 
consolidated balance sheet of Turkish manufacturing sector will discussed shortly. 
 










Source: Company Accounts, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. 
Foreign currency credits extended to manufacturing sector are used to evaluate 
liability dollarization tendency in the real sector. Currency (and maturity) composition of 
credits is analyzed to evaluate real sector liability dollarization. Credits extended to 
manufacturing sector consist of credits in cash, non-cash credits, bad debts, bonds, 
commercial papers and funds used for leasing. All items are decomposed in terms of Turkish 
lira and foreign currency (FC) and short term versus long term. The long term and short-term 
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improvement in real sector liability dollarization in the years between 1998 and 2003. All of 
the ratios examined fluctuate smoothly. But since consolidated data is used, further research 
by using sub-sectors data is needed to analyze. And asset side composition of manufacturing 
sector should also be examined to evaluate risks originating from currency mismatches in the 
balance sheets.  
V) DEDOLLARIZATION 
As the discussion so far demonstrates, dollarization creates different obstacles in 
policymaking process and leads economies suffering from external vulnerabilities and 
dedollarizing an economy can be very hard and costly (Galindo and Leiderman, 2005). Policy 
makers in dollarized countries are trying to solve financial dollarization related problems. In 
the light of these attempts, policy makers generally focused on two main complementary 
approaches. According to first approach, foreign exchange market in the domestic country 
necessitates “the revision and adaptation of existing prudential regulation in a way that 
eliminates distortions that hamper the use of local currency for financial transactions 
minimizing the costs in terms of financial disinter- mediation or distortions elsewhere” (Levy-
Yeyati and Arias 2003). On the other hand, a second approach is proposed to increase the 
effectiveness of the first approach. In this respect, the second approach necessities “designing 
of local currency instruments so as to create and enhance the local currency substitutes for 
foreign currency assets and development of market for these instruments” (Levy-Yeyati and 
Arias 2003). 
According to Levy-Yeyati and Arias (2003) the “stick” approach is related to 
prudential regulation.  The existing prudential norms have been backing foreign exchange 
deposits through unremunerated reserve requirements and deposit insurance. However since 
domestic currency banks are not ultimately vulnerable to sudden changes in devaluation 
expectations unlike bi-currency banks, assigning the same reserve requirement and liquidity 
ratios to both deposits may not be rational. Therefore the costs of intermediation of foreign 
currency have to be increased by higher (risk inclusive) reserve requirement and higher 
liquidity requirements. This factor also compensates for the limited capacity of central bank to 
fulfill its role as a lender of last resort. In addition to these measures, elimination of deposit 
insurance for foreign currency deposits, setting mandatory minimum holding period for 
foreign currency deposits, and imposing quantitative limits on risk taking behavior banks can 




and deposits. However, discouraging the usage of foreign currency instruments should be 
compensated and complemented by introducing alternative domestic instruments to reroute 
savings within the domestic markets. 
Levy-Yeyati and Arias (2003) note that the “carrot” approach is related to the usage 
and creation of domestic instruments instead of foreign currency instruments. For instance, 
CPI indexed assets turn out to be the most important component of this strategy. But these 
instruments should be design in a forward-looking manner not to create inflationary inertia. 
Moreover, while these assets are regarded as attractive for small savers, they are not capable 
of creating sufficient demand on borrowers’ side. Effectiveness of these assets should be 
increased with implementation of coherent and consistent monetary policy. The 
dedollarization efforts may increase capital flight, may decrease bank credits and may affect 
inflation and growth in relevant country. These negative consequences may be minimized by 
using the “carrot and stick” approaches (Reinhart et al. (2003)). 
In the highly dollarized economies, the derivatives markets perform a significant role.  
As demonstrated by Aquiar (2002), during Tequila crisis firms that are not fully hedged their 
dollarized liabilities lost their significant portion of net worth and investment and economic 
activity declined. In such a case, balance sheet effects at the firm level can have negative 
effects on investment, growth and financial sector even in countries in which domestic 
financial sector loans are not dollarized. Therefore, the derivatives markets should be 
constructed and promoted in highly dollarized countries.  
According to Reinhart et al. (2003), only four countries, Israel, Mexico, Poland and 
Pakistan, dedollarized their financial system successfully and the most notable country that 
has achieved public debt dedollarization is Mexico. When the experience of Mexico is 
analyzed, it can be seen that the composition of debt has started to change since 1995. While 
the ratio of external dollar denominated debt to total debt was 80% in 1995, it reduced to 
nearly 50% in 2002. Budgetary needs of government are funded entirely in local markets.  As 
explained by Galindo and Leiderman (2003), while debt management strategies have been 
important in explaining this pattern of debt composition, underlying fundamentals have been 
the most critical aspect in generating domestic currency debt markets. Mexico reduced its 
vulnerability to international capital markets crises substantially in the past years by reducing 
its share of dollar denominated public debt. This has been the result of strong and consistent 
fiscal consolidation accompanied by a prudent monetary policy. In addition, the integration of 




ratio of debt to GDP has decreased the lowest levels in the past 30 years, and interest rates 
have declined to historical lows.  
In the dedollarization route, developing capital markets in domestic currency or in 
indexed units associated to sound monetary and fiscal policy seems crucial. In that respect, 
CPI Indexed debt instruments are one of alternative assets.  But using CPI index instruments 
requires stability in inflation and real exchange rate depreciation, developed and well 
functioning secondary markets.  As explained by Galindo and Leiderman (2003), Latin 
American countries have frequently used CPI indexation in the past and the most successful 
country was Chile. It is believed that, the key to the success of the Chilean experience has 
been the credibility that index itself has developed as well as the credibility in monetary and 
fiscal policies. CPI indexation rules have not changed since the adoption of the UF (unidad de 
fomento - CPI indexed unit). However, the most important disadvantage of using CPI indexed 
instruments is increasing inflationary inertia in the dollarized economy. Therefore it should be 
designed in a forward-looking manner. To sum up, some countries may prefer to issue 
nonindexed domestic financial assets and other countries may prefer to use CPI indexed 
instruments.  
Israel’s experience demonstrates, promoting indexed instruments and the developing 
of domestic nominal financial assets in local markets may help to achieve dedollarization. 
When Israel’s dedollarization success is analyzed, it can be seen that dedollarization has been 
mostly side effect of stabilization efforts. However, stabilization efforts are complemented by 
relatively active policy of changing the composition of public sector deficit finance toward 
nominal, local currency assets, lengthening the maturity of domestic nominal assets, and with 
the introduction of foreign exchange rate risk hedging instruments such as futures, options 
and swaps. In addition to these, Israel’s experience also demonstrates ratchet effect in the 
process of indexation and dollarization. According to “ratchet effect”, dollarization and 
indexation process rapidly develop when inflation accelerates to relatively high levels, but it 
does not immediately disappear once inflation has been decreased. 
According to Licandro and Licandro (2003), any dedollarization strategy should base 
on two pillars. These two pillars are “strengthening of the safety net of the financial system” 
and “recreation of domestic currency asset markets”. They assert that financial regulation in 
several countries does not fully incorporate the risks involved in the dollarization of their 
business and it is necessary to rethink this situation that undoubtedly has favored 




system leads to an agent that perceives its income in domestic currency, even more so if that 
agent is state itself and liquidity requirements have to be higher in dollar business, reflecting 
the inability of Central banks to perform the lender of last resort in foreign currencies. They 
suggest the following scheme for a dedollarization strategy in Uruguay (see Table 6). 
 
 









Source: Licandro, Gerardo and Licandro, Jose, Antonio, 2003. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In general, partial dollarization is the result of some macroeconomic and institutional 
factors. Macroeconomic imbalances in country, such as high and volatile inflation rates and 
depreciating domestic currency, unsuccessful stabilization efforts, financial crises, under 
developed capital markets and loss of confidence in domestic currency may cause and 
exacerbate partial dollarization. In addition to these macroeconomic causes, some institutional 
factors may also affect the partial dollarization process in a country. For example, institutional 
factors and agents’ expectations of future political developments may play a significant role. 
Partial dollarization may hinder policy making in the economy. It may create obstacles for 
monetary policy implementation and it may also introduce complications into the choice of 
exchange rate regime. In addition, partial dollarization may cause sharing of real seignorage 
revenue by foreign currency issuer central bank and domestic currency issuer central bank. 
Hence financial dollarization also affects fiscal balances. In addition to these, it may cause 




Strengthening of the Safety Net of the Financial 
System 
 
Higher liquidity requirements in dollar operations.
Higher capital requirements when lending to the 
Non-Tradable sector in dollars. 
Create a deposit insurance scheme with higher 
premiums in dollars. 
Increase in the required participation of CPI 








Recreation of Domestic 
Currency Markets 
 
CPI Indexed Unit (UI, Unidad 
Indexada) 
Public Debt in the new unit 
(UI) 
Publicly owned banks focus 
on UI business. 





firms’ and financial institutions’ balance sheets increases fragility of real and financial sector. 
Lastly financial dollarization also may affect pricing behavior of firms in the economy. 
The dedollarization policies are now shifting from a generally passive stance of 
“learning to live with it” type approach to a more active stance such as “carrot and stick” 
approach. As mentioned in the previous section, an effective dedollarization strategy can be 
designed to consist of “carrot and stick” approach. This dual strategy mainly requires 
complementing of increasing cost of foreign currency demand by introducing domestic 
currency denominated financial instruments as alternatives.  
According to Galindo and Leiderman (2005) dedollarization is an endogenous 
outcome of a persistent process of disinflation and stabilization rather than being the main 
objective of a policy program. Levy-Yeyati and Arias (2003), on the other hand, stresses the 
need for designing policies to fight actively against dollarization. The recent Turkish 
experience can be interpreted as being consistent with the passive stance approach of Galindo 
and Leiderman (2005). 
Although dedollarization of the Turkish economy is not the main topic of this paper, 
the benefits of carrot and stick approach associated with successful stabilization program is 
clear when we consider implementation of Full Fledged Inflation Targeting Regime in the 
near future. As already discussed, partial dollarization creates some obstacles for successful 
implementation of FFIT and absence of external dominance (high degree dollarization) is 
required for a successful FFIT. Therefore, it could be argued that the need for an active 
dedollarization strategy such as the “carrot and stick” approach should be emphasized and 
discussed in Turkey. In addition to the “New Turkish Lira” Project and successful 
stabilization program, implementing “carrot and stick” approach by using prudential 
regulations and by creating attractive domestic instruments instead of foreign currency 
instruments may help to dedollarize economy. In such a framework, establishment of 
mortgage markets may perform important roles. For instance, a large small investor base for 
domestic currency denominated mortgage instruments may be aimed with a well designed 
publicity campaign focusing on addiction of Turkish people for real estates. And high public 
penetration of mortgage instruments may deepen financial markets and create alternative 
liquid and desirable domestic currency financial market instruments. Furthermore, İzmir 
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